The paper [12] examines a concept of equilibrium policies instead of optimal controls in stochastic optimization to analyze a mean-variance portfolio selection problem. We follow the same approach in order to investigate the Merton portfolio management problem in the context of non-exponential discounting, a context that give rise to time-inconsistency of the decision maker. Equilibrium policies are characterized in this context by means of a variational method which leads to a stochastic system that consists of a flow of forward-backward stochastic differential equations and an equilibrium condition. An explicit representation of the equilibrium policies is provided for the special cases of power, logarithmic and exponential utility functions.
Introduction

Background
The common assumption in classical investment-consumption problems under discounted utility is that the discount rate is assumed to be constant over time which leads to the discount function be exponential. This assumption provides the possibility to compare outcomes occurring at different times by discounting future utility by some constant factor. But on the other hand, results from experimental studies contradict this assumption indicating that discount rates for the near future are much lower than discount rates for the time further away in future. Ainslie, in [1] , established experimental studies on human and animal behaviour and found that discount functions are almost hyperbolic, that is, they decrease like a negative power of time rather than an exponential. Loewenstein & Prelec in [18] show that economic decision makers are impatient about choices in the short term but are more patient when choosing between long-term alternatives, and therefore a hyperbolic type discount function would be more realistic.
Unfortunately, as soon as discount function is non-exponential, discounted utility models become time-inconsistent in the sense that they do not admit the Bellman's optimality principle. Consequently, classical dynamic programming approach may not be applied to solve these problems. In light of the non-applicability of dynamic programming approach directly, there are two basic ways of handling time inconsistency in non exponential discounted utility models. In the first one, under the notion of naive agents, every decision is taken without taking into account that their preferences will change in the near future. The agent at time t ∈ [0, T ] will solve the problem as a standard optimal control problem with initial condition X(t) = x t . If we suppose that the naive agent at time 0 solves the problem, his ot her solution corresponds to the so-called pre-commitment solution, in the sense that it is optimal as long as the agent can pre-commit his or her future behavior at time t = 0. Kydland & Prescott in [17] indeed argue that a pre-committed strategy may be economically meaningful in certain circumstances. The second approach consists in the formulation of a time-inconsistent decision problem as a non cooperative game between incarnations of the decision maker at different instants of time. Nash equilibrium of these strategies are then considered to define the new concept of solution of the original problem. Strotz in [26] was the first who proposed a game theoretic formulation to handle the dynamic time inconsistent optimal decision problem on the deterministic Ramsey problem, see [25] . Then by capturing the idea of non-commitment, by letting the commitment period being infinitesimally small, he provided a primitive notion of Nash equilibrium strategy. Further work along this line in continuous and discrete time had been done by Pollak [24] , Phelps and Pollak [22] , Goldman [11] , Barro [2] and Krusell & Smith [16] . Keeping the same game theoretic approach, Ekland & Lazrak [7] and Marín-Solano & Navas [19] treated the optimal consumption problem where the utility involves a non-exponential discount function in the deterministic framework. They characterized the equilibrium strategies by a value function which must satisfy a certain "extended HJB equation", which is a non linear differential equation displaying a non local term, a term which depends on the global behaviour of the solution. In this situation, every decision at time t is taken by a t−agent which represents the incarnation of the controller at time t and is referred in [19] as a "sophisticated t−agent".
Björk & Murguci in [4] extends the idea to the stochastic setting where the controlled dynamic is driven by a quite general class of Markov process and a fairly general objective function. Yong in [27] , by a discretization of time, studied a class of time inconsistent deterministic linear quadratic models and derive equilibrium controls via some class of Riccati-Voltera equations. Yong in [28] , also by a discretization of time, investigated a general discounting time inconsistent stochastic optimal control problem and characterizes a feedback time-consistent Nash equilibrium control via the so-called "equilibrium HJB equation". In a series of papers, Basak & Chabakauri [3] , Hu et al. [12] , Czichowsky [6] and Björk et al. [5] look at the mean variance problem which is also time inconsistent.
Concerning equilibrium strategies for an optimal consumption-investment problem with a general discount function, Ekeland & Pirvu [8] are the first to investigate Nash equilibrium strategies where the price process of the risky asset is driven by geometric Brownian motion.
They characterize the equilibrium strategies through the solutions of a flow of BSDEs, and they show, for an special form of the discount function, that the BSDEs reduce to a system of two ODEs which has a solution. Ekeland et al. in [9] added life insurance to the investor's portfolio and they characterize the equilibrium strategy by an integral equation. In [28] , Yong discussed the case of time-inconsistent consumption-investment problem under a power utility function. Following Yong's approach, Zhao et al. in [30] studied the consumptioninvestment problem with a general discount function and a logarithmic utility function. Recently, Zou et al. in [31] investigated equilibrium consumption-investment decisions for Merton's portfolio problem with stochastic hyperbolic discounting.
Novelty and Contribution
The purpose of this paper is to investigate equilibrium solutions for a time-inconsistent consumption-investment problem with a non-exponential discount function and a general utility function. Different from [19] and [8] where the authors derived explicit solutions for special forms of the discount factor, in our model, the non-exponential discount function is in a fairly general form. Moreover, we consider equilibrium strategies in the open-loop sense, in a manner similar to [12] , which is different from most of the existing literature on this topic. Noting also that, the time-inconsistency, in our paper, arises from a non exponential discounting in the objective function, while the works [12] and [13] are concerned with a quite different kind of time-inconsistency which is caused by the presence of non linear term of expectations in the terminal cost. Second, the objective functional, in our paper, is not reduced to the quadratic form as in [12] .
The approach to solving the problem is based on a variational technique leading to a version of the stochastic maximum principle, which involves a flow of forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs) along with a certain equilibrium condition. Then by decoupling the flow of the FBSDEs, we derive a closed-loop representation of the equilibrium strategies via some parabolic non-linear partial differential equation (PDE). We show that within a special form of the utility function (logarithmic utility, power utility, and exponential utility) the PDE reduces to a system of ODEs which has an explicit solution.
We accentuate that, different from most of the existing literature on this topic where some feedback equilibrium strategies are derived via several very complicated highly nonlinear integro-differential equations, an explicit representation of the equilibrium strategies are obtained in our work via simple ODEs. In addition, this method can provide the necessary and sufficient conditions to characterize the equilibrium strategies, while the extended HJB techniques can create in general only the sufficient condition in the form of verification theorem that characterizes the equilibrium strategies.
Structure of the paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formulate the problem and give the necessary notations and preliminaries. In Section 3 we present the first main result of this work (Theorem 3.2), that characterizes equilibrium decisions. In Section 4, we derive an explicit representation of the equilibrium consumption-investment strategy. Section 5 is devoted to some comparisons with existing results in the literature. The paper ends with an Appendix containing some proofs.
Problem formulation
Throughout this paper, (Ω, F , (F t ) t∈[0,T ] , P) will be a filtered probability space such that F 0 contains all P-null sets, F T = F for an arbitrarily fixed finite time horizon T > 0 and (F t ) t∈[0,T ] satisfies the usual conditions. Recall that F t stands for the information available up to time t and any decision made at time t is based on this information. We also assume that all processes and random variables are well defined and adapted to this filtered probability space. Let
⊤ be a d-dimensional standard Brownian motion defined on (Ω, F , (F t ) t∈[0,T ] , P). For simplicity, it is assumed that the underlying filtration (F t ) t∈[0,T ] , coincides with the one generated by the Brownian motion.
Notations
Throughout this paper, we use the following notations: M ⊤ : the transpose of the vector (or matrix) M, χ, ζ : the inner product of χ and ζ, that is χ, ζ := tr(χ T ζ). For a function f, we denote by f x (resp. f xx ) the first (resp. the second) derivative of f with respect to the variable x.
For any Euclidean space E with Frobenius norm |.| we let for any
Financial market
Consider an individual facing the intertemporal consumption and portfolio problem where the market environment consists of one riskless and d risky securities. The risky securities are stocks and their prices are modelled as Itô processes. Namely, for i = 1, 2, .., d, the price
, of the i-th risky asset satisfies
with S i (0) > 0, for i = 1, 2, ..., d, and the coefficients µ i (·) and
-progressively measurable processes with values in R and R d , respectively. For brevity, we use µ (·) = (µ 1 (·) , µ 2 (·) , . . . , µ d (·)) to denote the drift rate vector and σ (·) = (σ ij (·)) 1≤i,j≤d to denote the random volatility matrix.
The riskless asset, or the savings account, has the price process S 0 (s), for
where r 0 (·) is a deterministic function with values in [0, ∞) that represents the interest rate. We assume that E [µ i (t)] > r 0 (t) ≥ 0, dt − a.e., for i = 1, 2, .., d. This is a very natural assumption, since otherwise nobody is willing to invest in the risky stocks.
Investment-consumption policies and wealth process
Starting from an initial capital x 0 > 0 at time 0, during the time horizon [0, T ], the decision maker is allowed to dynamically investing in the stocks as well as in the bond and consuming. A consumption-investment strategy is described by a (
⊤ , where c (s) represents the consumption rate at time s ∈ [0, T ] and u i (s) , for i = 1, 2, .., d, represents the amount invested in the i-th risky stock at time
⊤ is called an investment strategy.
The amount invested in the bond at time s is
is the wealth process associated with the strategy u (·) and the initial capital x 0 . The evolution of
Accordingly, the wealth process solves the following SDE
where
We impose the following assumption about the coefficients.
(H1) The processes r 0 (.) , r (.) and σ (.) , are uniformly bounded. We also assume a uniform ellipticity condition as follows:
for some ǫ > 0, where I d denotes the identity matrix on R d×d .
for some positive constant K. In particular for t = 0,
F (0, T ; R) and the following estimate holds
General discounted utility function
Most of financial-economics works have considered that the rate of time preference is constant (exponential discounting). However there is growing evidence to suggest that this may not be the case. In this section, we discuss the general discounting preferences. We also introduce the basic modeling framework of Merton's consumption and portfolio problem. We refer the reader to [10] , [14] , [20] , [21] and [23] for more detail about the classical Merton model.
Discount function
As soon as discounting is non-exponential, most papers work with special form of the nonexponential discount factor. Different to these works we consider a general form of the discount factor.
We also impose the following Lipschitz condition with constant C, on λ (·)
Remark 2.3. Assumption (H2) is satisfied by many discount functions, such as exponential discount functions [20] , [21] , mixture of exponential functions [8] and hyperbolic discount functions [30] .
Utility functions and objective
In order to evaluate the performance of a consumption-investment strategy, the decision maker derives utility from intertemporal consumption and final wealth. Let ϕ (·) be the utility of intertemporal consumption and h (·) the utility of the terminal wealth at some non-random horizon T (which is a primitive of the model). Then, for any (t, ξ)
(Ω, F t , P; R) the investment-consumption optimization problem is reduced to maximize the utility function J (t, ξ, .) given by
We restrict ourselves to utility functions which satisfy the following condition (H3) The maps ϕ, h : R → R are strictly increasing, strictly concave twice continuously differentiable functions and satisfy the Inada conditions. We suppose also that, there exists a positive constant C such that
We shall denote by I(·) the (continuous, strictly decreasing) inverse of the marginal utility function ϕ x (·) .
If we write
and we denote B (s) = −1, r (s)
then the optimal control problem associated with (2.4) and (2.7) is equivalent to maximize
Time inconsistency
Let us first note that the optimal policies, although they exist, will not be time-consistent in general. First of all, as an illustration, let us consider the model in (2.8)-(2.9) with logarithmic utility functions, we suppose that the financial market consists of one riskless asset and d risky assets. Arguing as in [8] , we can prove that, if the agent is naive and starts with a given positive wealth x, at some instant t, then by the standard dynamic programming approach, the value function associated with this stochastic control problem solves the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
The HJB equation contains the term
, which depends not only on the current time s but also on initial time t so the optimal policy will depend on t as well. Indeed, the first order necessary conditions yield the t−optimal policy
Let us consider the following example: ϕ (x) = h (x) = log x. The naive agent for the initial pair (0, x 0 ) solves the problem, assuming that the discount rate of time preference will be λ (s), for s ∈ [0, T ] , the optimal consumption strategy will be
This solution corresponds to the so-called pre-commitment solution, in the sense that it is optimal as long as the agent can precommit (by signing a contract, for example) his or her future behavior at time t = 0. If there is no commitment, the 0-agent will take the action c 0,x 0 (s) but, in the near future, the ǫ-agent will change his decision rule (timeinconsistency) to the solution of the HJB equation (2.10) with t = ǫ. In this cas the optimal control trajectory for s > ǫ will be changed to c ǫ,xǫ (s) given by
If λ (t) = e −δt where δ > 0 is the constant discount rate, then
hence the optimal consumption plan is time consistent. As soon as discount function is non-exponential c
Then the optimal consumption plan is not time consistent. In general, the solution for the naive agent will be constructed by solving the family of HJB equations (2.10) for t ∈ [0, T ], and patching together the "optimal" solutions c t,xt (t). If the agent is sophisticated, things become more complicated. The standard HJB equation cannot be used to construct the solution, and a new method is required in what follows.
Equilibrium strategies
It is well known that the problem described above by (2.8) − (2.9) turn out to be time inconsistent in the sense that it does not satisfy the Bellman optimality principle, since a restriction of an optimal control for a specific initial pair on a later time interval might not be optimal for that corresponding initial pair. For a more detailed discussion see Ekeland & Pirvu [8] and Yong [28] . Since lack of time consistency, we consider open-loop Nash equilibrium controls instead of optimal controls. As in [12] , we first consider an equilibrium by local spike variation, given for t
We have the following definition.
for any t ∈ [0, T ] . The corresponding equilibrium wealth process solves the following SDE
3.1 A necessary and sufficient condition for equilibrium controls
In this paper we follow an alternative approach, which is essentially a necessary and sufficient condition for equilibriums. In the same spirit of proving the stochastic Pontryagin's maximum principle for equilibriums in [12] for the case of linear quadratic models, we derive this condition by a second-order expansion in the spike variation. We define what we mean by an equilibrium rule, and then we derive a parabolic backward PDE. Our PDE is comparable with the one obtained in [19] and [8] , for some particular discount functions in finite horizon with different utility functions. First, we introduce the adjoint equations involved in the characterization of open-loop Nash equilibrium controls.
Adjoint processes
an admissible strategy and denote byX (·) ∈ L 2 F (0, T ; R) the corresponding wealth process. For each t ∈ [0, T ], we introduce the first order adjoint equation defined on the time interval [t, T ], and satisfied by the pair of processes (p (·; t) , q (·; t)) as follows dp (s; t) = −r 0 (s) p (s; t) ds + q (s; t)
where q (·; t) = (q 1 (·; t) , . . . , q d (·; t)) ⊤ . Under the assumption (H1), the equation
Moreover there exists a constant K > 0 such that, for any t ∈ [0, T ] , we have the following estimate
The second order adjoint equation is defined on the time interval [t, T ] and satisfied by the pair of processes (P (·; t) ,
where Q (·; t) = (Q 1 (·; t) , . . . , Q d (·; t)) ⊤ . Under (H1) the above BSDE has a unique solution
Moreover we have the following representation for P (·; t)
Indeed, if we define the function Θ (s, ·) , for each s ∈ [0, T ] , as the fundamental solution of the following linear ODE
then, we apply the Itô's formula to τ → P (τ ; t) Θ (s, τ ) 2 on [s, T ] and by taking conditional expectations we obtain (3.7). Note that since h xx X (T ) ≤ 0, then P (s; t) ≤ 0, ds − a.e.
A characterization of equilibrium strategies
The following theorem is the main result of this work, it provides a necessary and sufficient condition for equilibriums. First, we define the processq (s; t) = 0, q (s; t)
⊤ ⊤
, and we introduce the following notations
and
F t, T ; R d be the unique solution to the BSDE (3.4). Thenû (·) is an equilibrium consumption-investment strategy, if and only if, the following condition holds H (t; t) = 0, dP−a.s., dt − a.e.
(3.11)
In order to derive the proof of this theorem, let us derive some technical results. First, denote byX ε (·) the solution of the state equation corresponding to u ε (·). Since the coefficients of the controlled state equation are linear, then by the standard perturbation approach, see e.g. [29] , we haveX
where for any R d+1 −valued, F t −measurable and bounded random variable v and for any ε ∈ [0, T − t) , y ε,v (·) and z ε,v (·) solve the following linear stochastic differential equations, respectively
Proposition 3.3. Let (H1) holds. For any t ∈ [0, T ] , the following estimates hold for any k ≥ 1 :
In addition, we have the following equality
Proof. See the Appendix.
Now, we present the following technical lemma needed later in this study. It proof follows an argument adapted from Hu el al. [13] , ii) H (t; t) = 0, dP − a.s, dt − a.e.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. Given an admissible strategŷ 
where we have used in the last inequality the fact that, under the concavity condition of ϕ (·) and h (·), it follows A (s; t) v, v ≤ 0. Henceû (.) is an equilibrium strategy. Conversely, assume thatû (·) is an equilibrium strategy. Then, by (3.2) together with (3.18) , for any (t, u) ∈ [0, T ] × R d+1 the following inequality holds:
Clearly Φ (., .) is well defined. Moreover, easy manipulations show that the inequality (3.19) is equivalent to
It is easy to see that the maximum condition (3.20) leads to the following condition,
According to Lemma 3.4, the expression (3.11) follows immediately. This completes the proof.
Equilibrium when the coefficients are deterministic
Theorem 3.2. shows that one can obtain equilibrium consumption-investment strategies by solving a system of FBSDEs which is not standard since the "flow" of the unknown process (p (·; t) , q (·; t)) t∈[0,T ] is involved. Moreover, there is an additional constraint that act on the "diagonal" (i.e. when s = t) of the flow. As far as we know, the explicitly solvability of this type of equations remains an open problem, even with a particular form of the utility functions. However, we are able to solve quite thoroughly this problem when the parameters r (·) and σ (·) are deterministic functions.
In this section, let us look at the Merton's portfolio problem with general discounting and deterministic parameters. At first, we consider the following parabolic backward partial differential equation 
of the PDE (4.1) such that the stochastic differential equation
2) has a unique solutionX (·) , then the equilibrium consumption-investment strategyû (·) =
3)
is an equilibrium control and denote bŷ X (·) the corresponding wealth process. Then in view of Theorem 3.2 there exist an adapted process X (·) , (p (·; t) , q (·; t)) t∈[0,T ] solution to the following flow of forward-backward SDEs, parametrized by t
whith conditions
From the terminal condition in the first order adjoint process we consider the following Ansatz
for some deterministic function V (.,
. Applying Itô's formula to (4.8), it yields dp (s;
Next, comparing the ds term in (4.9) by the ones in the second equation in (4.5) , we deduce that 10) and by comparing the dW (s) terms we also get
We put the above expressions of p (s; t) and q (s; t) at s = t into (4.6) and (4.7) , then
which leads to the following representation
14)
, dt − a.e. Then by taking expressions (4.14) and (4.15) into (4.10), this suggests that V (., .) coincides with the solution of the PDE (4.1), evaluated along the trajectoryX (t) , solution of the state equation.
Remark 4.2. Equation (4.1) is comparable with the one in Marín-Solano & Navas [19] and Ekland & Pirvu [8] , in which the equilibrium is defined within the class of feedback controls.
Special utility functions
Equilibrium investment-consumption strategies for Merton's portfolio problem with general discounting and deterministic parameters have been studied in [19] , [8] and [28] among others in different frameworks. In this section, we discuss some special cases in which the function θ (., .) may be separated into functions of time and state variables. Then, one needs only to solve a system of ODEs in order to completely determine the equilibrium strategies. We will compare our results with some existing ones in literature.
Potential utility function
To make the problem (2.8) − (2.9) explicitly solvable, we consider power utility functions for the running and terminal costs. That is, ϕ (c) = c γ γ and h (x) = a x γ γ , with a > 0 and γ ∈ (0, 1) . In this case the PDE (4.1) reduces to
From the terminal condition, we consider the following trial solution
for some deterministic function Π (.) ∈ C 1 ([0, T ] , R) with the terminal condition Π (T ) = 1. Then by substituting in (4.1) , we obtain
It remains to determine the function Π (.) , First, by the change of variable 4) we find that y (.) should solve the following ODE  
A variation of constant formula yields
subsequently we obtain
In view of Theorem 4.1, the representation of the Nash equilibrium strategies (4.3)-(4.4) giveĉ 6) which is comparable with the ones obtained by Marín-Solano & Navas [19] , Ekland & Pirvu [8] and Yong [28] .
Logarithmic utility function
Now, let us analyse the case where ϕ (c) = ln (c) , and h (x) = a ln (x) , with a > 0. In this case the PDE (4.1) reduces to
(5.7)
Once again, we know that the solution of (5.7) will be of the form 9) which is explicitely solved by
In view of Theorem 4.1, the representation of the Nash equilibrium strategies (4.3)-(4.4) then giveĉ 
(5.12) We try a solution of the form
This suggests that functions φ (.) and ψ (.) should solve the following system of equations
14) which is explicitly solvable for t ∈ [0, T ] , by
The representation of the Nash equilibrium strategies (4.3)-(4.4) givê
The above solutions is comparable with the ones obtained in Marín-Solano & Navas [19] by solving an extended Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations.
Special discount function
As well documented in [19] , an agent making a decision at time t is usually called the t-agent, and can act in two different ways: naive and sophisticated. Naive agents take decisions without taking into account that their preferences will change in the near future, and then any t-agent will solve the problem as a standard optimal control problem with initial condition X(t) = x t and his decision will be in general time-inconsistent. In order to obtain a time consistent strategy, the t-agent should be sophisticated, in the sense of taking into account the preferences of all the s-agents, for s ∈ [t, T ]. Therefore, the approach to handle the time inconsistency in dynamic decision making problems is by considering time-inconsistent problems as non-cooperative games with a continuous number of players, in which decisions at every instant of time are selected. The solution to the problem of the agent with non-constant discounting should be constructed by looking for the subgame perfect equilibria of the associated game with an infinite number of t-agents. In [19] the authors looked for a solution of a sophisticated agent to the modified HJB (which is not a partial differential equation due to the presence of a non-local term). Then, they need to define the Markov equilibrium strategies, while in our work and different from [19] , we use the open-loop equilibrium strategies, this is a significant difference which leads to obtain an important change in the results.
Exponential discounting with constant discont rate (Classical model)
At first, we consider the standard exponential discount function λ (t) = e −δ 0 t , t ∈ [0, T ], where δ 0 > 0 is a constant representing the discount rate. In this case, our equilibrium solution for the three cases become 1) Logarithmic utilitŷ , dt − a.e.
3) Exponential utilitŷ
c (t) = − 1 γ ln ae −(T −t)δ 0 + φ (t)X (t) + ψ (t) , dt − a.e., u I (t) = Σ (t) r (t) 1 γφ (t)
, dt − a.e.
where K (·) , φ (·) are given by (5.2) and (5.15) , respectively, and Notice that our solutions given above coincide with the optimal solutions of classical Merton portfolio problem (see e.g. [19] in the case with constant discount rate). This confirms the well-known fact that the time-consistent equilibrium strategy for an exponential discount function is nothing but the optimal strategy. A relevant remark is that the portfolio rule is independent of the discount factor, and it is the same for the non-exponential discount function.
Exponential discounting with non constant discount rate (Karp's model)
Now, following Karp [15] , let us assume that the instantaneous discount rate is non-constant, but a function of time δ (l), for l ∈ [0, T ]. Impatient agents will be characterized by a nonincreasing discount rate δ (·). The discount factor used to evaluate a payoff at times τ ≥ 0, is given by λ (τ ) = e In this case the objective is exactly the same as Marín-Solano and Navas [19] , in which the equilibrium is however defined within the class of feedback controls. In [19] , the (feedback) equilibrium consumption-investment solutions (also called the sophisticated consumptioninvestment strategies) are summarized as 3) Exponential utilitŷ c (t) = φ (t)X (t) + C (t) − ln (γaφ (t)) γ , dt − a.e., (6.7)
u I (t) = Σ (t) r (t) 1 γφ (t)
, dt − a.e. (t) , dt − a.e., (6.11) u I (t) = Σ (t) r (t)X (t) , dt − a.e. (6.12)
Now, applying the second order Taylor-Lagrange expansion to ϕ Γ ⊤ u ε (s) − ϕ Γ ⊤ u (s) , we find
